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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
YS. 
J~-\.CK L. CLARK, 
RcsJwnrlent, t 
Appellant. ) 
Case No. 
7371 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an appeal by the defendant, Jack L. Clark, 
from the verdict of the jury and the judgment of the 
court convicting him ·of the crime of involuntary man-
slaughter arising out of an automobile accident which 
occurred on December 16, 1948, at approximately 11:30 
p.m. 
Appellant's brief summarizes very completely the 
evidence and testimony which was presented to the Court 
and jury upon which the conviction was based. Respon-
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dent will therefore refrain from making an independent 
presentation of the facts at this time but will do so where 
nescessary in view of the fact that appellant relies 
for a reversal of the judgment of conviction partly on 
the ground that, as he contends, the evidence was in-
sufficient to show that defendant was guilty of "reckless 
conduct or conduct evincing a marked disregard for 
the safety of others.'' 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. The evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict. 
II. The Court did not prejudicially instruct the jury 
concerning the alleged acts of willful or wanton mis-
conduct. 
III. The Court properly refused to give defendant's 
requested instruction No. 2. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE 
VERDICT. 
In his brief appellant argues that there was in-
s:uffcient evidence from which the jury could conclude 
either: 
(a) That the defendant drove his automobile at a 
speed greater than was reasonable and prudent, having 1 il 
4 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
regard for the actual and potential' hazards then exist~ 
ing; or 
(b) That the defendant drove his automobile to the 
left of the center of the highway in an attempt to over .. 
take and pass another vehicle proceeding in the same 
direction. 
In detennining whether or not defendant drove 
his car at a rate of sp€ed greater than was reasonable 
and prudent under the conditions and having regard 
for the actual and potential hazards then existing, it 
must be remembered that regardless of the actual speed 
of defendant's car, which was never accurately deter-
mined because the Sp€edometer was not working, the un-
controYerted testimony in the record shows that the high-
way was icy and slippery and that the defendant drove 
his car knowing this and also that the rear tires were worn 
smooth, and consequently he did not have good traction. 
Furthermore, the defendant admitted he had been drink-
ing some beers earlier in the evening, which fact could 
certainly be considered in determining the reasonable-
ness or unreasonableness of the rate of speed at which 
defendant was driving under the circumstances. In 
addition, the physical evidence at the scene of the acci-
dent could properly be considered, together with all the 
other evidence and testimony, in determining whether 
or not, under the circumstances, the speed at which de-
fendant was driving was reasonable or unreasonable. 
It is respectfully submitted that there was ample and 
sufficient testimony and evidence presented which justi-
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fied the Court in submitting the issue of speed to the 
jury. 
With reference to the matter of submitting question 
of issuable fact to the jury, it is stated in 61 0. J. 8., 
beginning at page 800, that: 
"* * * in prosecutions for homicides occa-
sioned through the operation of motor vehicles 
and for assault with intent to kill or murder, ordi-
narily it is the province of the court to determine 
questions of law, and that of the jury to determine, 
under proper instructions, issues of fact, such as 
the weight to be given the evidence and the credi-
bility of the witnesses. Where there is evidence 
on which th jury may justifiably find the exis-
tence or nonexistence of any material facts in 
issue, and the evidence is conflicting or of such 
a character that different conclusions may rea-
sonably be drawn therefrom, the issues should be 
submited to the jury. 
''In numerous cases various issues have been 
held questions of fact for the jury, such as * * * ; 
the speed or excessive or unlawful speed of ac-
cused's motor vehicle; whether accused was driv-
ing on the wrong side, or over the center line, 
of the highway, * * * '' 
Also, in 5 Am. Jur. at page 882 it is stated that: 
"* * * It is generally for the jury to decide 
whether the speed of the vehicle proximately con-
tributed to the accident, and whether such speed 
was excessive, considering in connection therewith 
the hazards of the surrounding circumstances.'' 
This Honorable Court held in St;ate v. Lake, 196 P. 
1015, 57 Utah 619, a case which involved a prosecution 
6 
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for involuntary manslaughter, that the question of whe-
ther or not the defendant's automobile was running at 
a dangerous or excessiYe rate of speed at the time it 
struck and killed deceased was e;rclusi.vely a jury ques-
tion. In the course of the opinion it was said : 
· · "\Yhether or not the defendant's car was 
running at a dangerous or excessive rate of speed 
was a question exclusiYely for the jury under the 
facts of the instant case. The witness 0. C. An-
derson, after duly qualifying as to his con1petency 
to express an opinion, testified that in his opinion 
defendant's car, when it struck the boy, was 
running at a speed of 40 miles an hour. Defen-
dant's witnesses testified tht the speedometer 
on the car indicated only 23 or 24 miles an hour. 
Under these circumstances we are not prepared to 
hold as a matter of la-w that there was no substan-
tial evidence to support the charge that the speed 
was in excess of 25 miles an hour. Besides this, 
there was also evidence to the effect that the 
boy was thrown by the impact a distance of 25 
or 30 feet, and that the car continued on its 
course for a distance of 200 feet before it was 
stopped. These circumstances had a bearing upon 
the question of speed and were no doubt con-
sidered by the jury in arriving at a conclusion." 
See also Steff ani v. State, 45 Ariz. 210, 42 P. (2d) 615; 
People v. Flores, 83 CA 2d. 11, 187 P. (2d) 910; Cowart 
v. Lewis, 151 Miss. 221, 117 So. 531, 61 A.L.R. 1229; 
Whiting v. Andrus, 173 Ore.133, 144 P. (2d) 501. 
With reference to the matter of sufficient evidence 
to prove that defendant drove his automobile to the left 
of the center of the highway it is respectfully submitted 
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that this too was a question for the jury, which the jury 
decided adversely to the defendant. It will be noted that 
the jury was instructed in Instruction No. 7 that: 
''Before you are warranted in ·convicting the 
defendant the State must prove beyond a reason-
able doubt * * * 
(2) that* * *,or that he drove his automo-
bile to the left side of the center of the roadway 
* * *" 
And again in Instruction No. 14 that : 
'' * * * to warrant you in convicting the de-
fendant, the evidence must, to your minds, exclude 
every reasonable hypothesis other than that of 
the guilt of the defendant. That is to say, if after 
an entire consideration and comparison of all the 
testimony in the case, you can reasonably explain 
the facts given in evidence on any reasonable 
ground other than the guilt of the defendant, you 
should acquit him.'' 
In considering the evidence as to whether or not the de-
fendant drove his automobile to the left of the center of 
the roadway, in the light of the aforesaid instructions the 
jury must necessarily have convinced themselves beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the defendant did in fact drive 
his automobile to the left of the center of the roadway. 
As stated in the case of Wallis v. :Nauman, 
61 Wyo. 231, 157 P. 2d 285: ":H; * * The burden is 
upon the driver on the wrong side o~ the road to . ex-
cuse or justify the violation of the law of the road.'' 
8 
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It is respectfully subnritted that this was a jury question 
and that the defendant failed to meet the burden of 
proof placed upon him to excuse or justify the presence 
of the automobile he was driving at the time of the acci-
dent on the wrong side of the highway. In this con-
nection see also the cases of State v. Birch, ·183 Wash. 
670, -!9 P. (2d) 921; State v. Riddle, ______ Utah------, 188 P. 
2d -!-19: Hozcard v. Sta.te, ------- Okla. ------, 199 P. (2d) 240. 
It is submitted likewise that the · Court did not 
commit prejudici3:l error in denying defendant's motion 
for a dismissal on the grounds that the evidence was 
insufficient to submit to the jury. As held by this Honor-
able Court in the case of State v. Thatcher, 108 Utah 63, 
157 P. (2d) 258: 
''The rule which must be applied upon a mo-
tion to dismiss a criminal case is that all reason-
able inferences are to be taken in favor of the 
state, and only if the record itself reveals that 
no reasonable man could draw an inference of 
guilt therefrom is the trial court justified in tak-
ing the case from the jury.'' · 
Respondent respectfully submits that no such case is 
presented here but that there was sufficient evidence to 
submit to the jury on the question of whether defendant 
operated his automobile at an excessive rate of speed 
in view of the actual and potential hazards then exist-
ing, and also sufficient evidence to submit to the jury on 
the question of whether the defendant operated his auto-
mobile on the wrong side of the highway. 
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II. 
THE COURT DID NOT PREJUDICIALLY INSTRUCT 
THE JURY CONCERNING THE ALLEGED ACTS OF WILL-
FUL OR WANTON MISCONDUCT. 
It is argued by the appellant that the verdict of 
the jury cannot be sustained because the Court failed 
to instruct the jury that before they could find the de-
fendant guilty, they must unanimously determine that he 
was guilty of willful or wanton misconduct as to one or 
both of the alleged grounds of negligence set forth in 
the Court's instructions. Instruction No. 7, the one 
complained of, reads as follows: 
''Before you are warranted in convicting the 
defendant, the State must prove beyond a rea-
sonable doubt the following: 
(1) That the defendant, Jack L. Clark, 
drove an automobile on or about the 16th day 
of December, 1948, upon a highway in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. 
(2) That he drove the automobile at a rate 1 .; 
of speed greater than was reasonable and prudent 
under the conditions and having regard to the !: 
actual and potential hazards then existing, or that 
he drove an automobile to the left side of the 
center of the roadway while overtaking and pass-
ing another vehicle proceeding in the same direc-
tion at a time when the left-hand side of the 
highway was not free of oncoming traffic for such 
a sufficient distance ahead as to permit him to 
complete· the pass and return to the right-hand 
side of the highway in time to avoid a collision 
with an automobile proceeding in the opposite 
direction. That in committing one or both of the 
10 
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acts set forth herein the defendant was g·uilty of 
crin1inal negligence as defined herein. 
(3) That as a result of the manner in which 
the defendant unlawfully drove his car, if you so 
find, John D. Cutler was killed without malice. 
(-!) That the manner in 'vhich the defendant 
drove his autmnobile as set forth in paragraph 
(2) was the proxilnate cause or proximately con-
tributed to the death of John D. Cutler. 
It is not enough that the State prove one 
or more of the elements set forth above, but it is 
necesary in order to justify a verdict of guilty 
that each of the four elements set forth above be 
proved to your satisfaction and beyond a reason-
able doubt.'' 
Appellant admits that no request for a clarifying 
instruction was submitted but attempts to justify this 
on the ground that under his theory of the ·case there 
was insufficient evidence to go to the jury, particularly 
on the matter of whether defendant was attempting to 
pass other vehicles. The general rule with reference to 
the necessity of requesting more explicit instructions 
is set forth in 53 .Am. Jur. at page 414 as follows: 
''Even though the trial court may be required 
to give general instructions on the issues without 
request from counsel, it is generally considered 
to be the duty of counsel to assist the court in the 
function of instructing the jury. It is an estab-
lished general ru1e that when a party is of the 
opinion that the instructions given by the court 
are not explicit enough upon certain points or do 
not cover all phases of the case, he should call 
the attention of the court to that fact, and tender 
11 
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other and fuller instructions or request the -court 
to give such further instructions as he desires; 
otherwise he cannot predicate error upon omis~ 
sions in the charge as given.'' 
As to the application of this general rule in homicide 
cases see 26 Am. Jur. 522, Homicide, Sec. 528. 
It is submitted that if appellant was entitled to the 
type of instruction concerning which he now complains, 
its was the duty of counsel for appellant to have pre-
sented such an instruction to the court and asked that it 
be given. His failure in this respect, regardless of the 
reason now proffered for such neglect, precludes appel-
lant from now complaining of the failure of the Court 
in not giving such an instruction. Moreover it is respect-
fully submitted that the cases cited by appellant in sup-
port if his Point No. 2 do not substantiate the principle 
relied upon to set aside the verdict. 
A careful reading of State v. Johnson, 76 Utah 84, 
287 P. 909, cited by appellant, reveals that the case was 
reversed, among other reasons, not because it could 
not be determined whether or not the jurors unani-
mously agreed upon one or more of the several acts of 
negligence with which defendant was charged, but be-
cause the trial court submitted the question of intoxica-
tion to the jury. The Court held that this was prejudicial 
and reversible error because there was not sufficient 
evidence to show that the defendant was under the influ-
ence of intoxicating liquor at the time of the automobile 
accident and therefore that that issue should not have 
be~n submitted to the jury. 
12 
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'Yhile a casual reading of State v. Rasmussen, 92 
Utah 357, 68 P. (2d) 176, and State v. Bleaz.ard, 103 Utah 
13, 133 P. (2d) 1000, the other two cases cited by ap-
pellant in support of his Point No. 2, would appear at 
first blush to support the principle for which appellant 
argues, a careful reading of those cases and the later 
cases of State v. Roedl, 107 Utah 538, 155 P. (2d) 741, 
and State v. Thompson, 110 Utah 113, 170 P. (2d) 153, 
discloses that tlris Honorable Court did not enunciate 
that principle. In the course of the opinion in the 
Thompson case (supra), involving a question of first 
degree murder, it was said: 
•' The case was submited to the jury on two 
theories of murder in the first degree : 1. That 
the killing 'was intentional, deliberate and pre-
meditated and done with malice aforethought.' 
2. That the killing 'was perpetrated by an act 
greatly dangerous to the lives of others, evidenc-
ing a depraved mind regardless of human life.' 
After the evidence was in the defendant moved 
the court to require the state to elect on which 
one of these theories of murder in the first degree 
it would stand, and assigns as error the court's 
refusal to grant that motion. Counsel, however, 
does not argue that it was error to submit both of 
these theories to the jury, but contends that under 
the instructions given the jury was authorized 
to find the defendant guilty of murder in the first 
degree, if all jurors were satisfied that he was 
guilty thereof, even though some of them believed 
him guilty only under one theory and others 
believed him guilty only under the other theory. 
To the effect that such instruction would be er-
roneous he quotes from State v. Roedl, 107 Utah 
13 
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538, 155 P. 2d 741, 747, where referring to St·ate 
v. Ra.smussen, 92 Utah 357, 68 P. 2d 176, we said: 
'While we held in that case in a prosecu-
tion for involuntary manslaughter wherein sev-
eral unlawful acts, such as driving at an unlawful 
rate of speed, driving without a proper lookout, 
and others, were alleged to have been committed 
resulting in death, the jury must unanimously 
agree on one or more of the specified unlawful 
acts and they may not combine their conclusions 
on different specified acts so as to converge on an 
ultimate verdict of guilty.' 
There is doubt that the Rasmussen case really 
holds what we in the Roedl case said it did. In 
the opinion first appearing in the Rasmussen 
case, written by Mr. Justice :Moffat and concurred 
in by :Mr. Justice Ephraim Hanson, it was stated 
as their opinion that the jury must agree unani-
mously on one or more of the specified unlawful 
acts, and that the judgment of the trial court 
should be reversed on that account but that was 
not the opinion of a majority of the court. Each 
of the other three Justices wrote a separate 
opinion but none of such separate opinions defi-
nitely holds that all of the jurors must unani-
n1ously agree on one or more of the specified 
unlawful acts but simply hold, without deciding 
that question, that even if that is the law the 
jury was sufficiently instructed to that effect in 
that case. Nor was that question determined in 
the Roedl case. There we held that regardless of 
what the law is on that question no prejudicial 
error was committed because the evidence was 
so conclusive on the question of a deliberate and 
premeditated killing that the jury could not have 
been misled thereby. 
14 
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It is also not necessarY for us to deeide that 
q1.wstiPn and we therefore· do not decide it here. 
Counsel. to sustain his contention that the court 
authorized the jury to find the defendant guilty 
of 1nurder in the first degree. even though some 
found him g·uilty only under one theory and others 
found hin1 guilty only under the other theory, 
relies on the following instruction : 
• Before you nu1y find the defendant guilty 
of Inluder in the first degree, all of the jurors 
must concur as to either one or the other of the 
kinds of murder above referred to * * *' 
That statement says in effect that before the 
jur~- is authorized to find the defendant guilty 
of murder in the first degree all of the jurors 
must concur in finding him guilty under one the-
ory or all of them must concur in finding hin1 
guilty under the other theory. Almost the exact 
words used in this instruction are used with that 
meaning in some of the opinions in the Rasmussen 
case. It is clear that this is the correct construction 
when we consider the fact that the court is cau-
tioning the jury that: Before they may find the 
defendant guilty of murder in the first degree 
'all of the jurors must concur as to either one o.r 
the other of the kinds of murder above referred 
to.' 
On the other hand, a different meaning would 
have been indicated had the court said: That all 
that is necessary in order to find the defendant 
guilty of murder in the first degree is that' all of 
the jurors must concur as to either one or the 
other of the kinds of murder above referred to.' 
The italicized portions of the above sentences, 
as indicated, are directly quoted from the instruc-
tion, and are the same in both sentences but by 
15 
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the change in the previous context and a change 
in the emphasis placed on the words, a different 
meaning is obtained. The fact that the court is 
cautioning the jury, that in determining its ver-
dict, it must observe the limitations therein stated, 
rather than suggesting that such limitations are 
unimportant clearly indicates an intention to limit 
the jury in finding the defendant guilty of mur-
der in the first degree to a situation where all 
the jurors unanimously concurred in such finding 
on the same theory of such murder. Thus the in-
structions of the court were in accord with what 
the defendant contends they should have been.'' 
In connection with this same matter, th~ attention 
of this Honorable Court is invited to the holding of the 
Supreme Court of the State of Montana in the recent 
case of State v. Souhra.da (1949), ________ Mont. ________ , 204 
P. (2d) 792. The case involved a prosecution of a motor-
ist for involuntary manslaughter in which he was charged 
with several acts of specific negligence in the operation 
of his automobile. In the course of its opinion the court 
said: 
''The trial court denied several instructions 
requested by defendant, to the effect that, in this 
case all twelve of the jurors would have to find 
beyond a reasonable doubt upon a specific act, or 
the specific acts, or omission, or 01nissions, which 
constituted criminal negligence and which proxi-
mately caused the deaths of the pers·ons named, 
in order to find the defendant guilty, or, in other 
words, that some of the jurors could not agree 
on one or more of the acts alleged, and others of 
the jurors, upon other acts, or act, omission, or 
omissions, and find the defendant guilty. In 
urging as error the trial court's failure to so 
16 
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instruct, the defendant re1ie~ upon several cases 
decided by the Supreme Court of Utah, namely: 
State Y. Bleazard, 103 Utah 113, 133 P. 2d 1000; 
State Y. Rasunn1ssen, 92 Utah :i57, 68 P. 2d 176; 
State Y. Johnson, 76 Utah 84,287 P. 909. 
A reading of these cases and the later Utah 
rases of State Y. Thon1pson, 110 Utah 11:\ 170 P. 
2d 153, and State Y. Roedl, 107 Utah 538, 1.):) P. 2d 
7-1:1. discloses that the Snpre1ne Court of Utah did 
not so decide. It is not necessary tltef a .fu.ry, iu 
order to find a verdict, should conc~tr in a si·ngle 
riew of the transaction disclosed by the evidence. 
If the conclusion may be justified upon either of 
two interpretations of the evidence, the verdict 
cannot be impeached by showing that a part of 
the jury proceeded upon one interpretation, and 
part upon the other. ~Iurray v. New York Life 
Ins. Co., 96 N.Y. 614, 48 Am. Rep. 658; People v. 
Sullivan, 173 N.Y. 122, 65 N.E. 989, 63 L.R.A. 
353, 93 Am. St. Rep. 582; State v. Flathers, 57 
S.D. 320, 232 N.W. 51, 72 A.L.R. 150, annotation 
at 154.'' (Italics added.) 
It is respectfully submitted that no prejudicial error 
was committed by the Court by the manner in which 
it instructed the jury as to the alleged acts of ·criminal 
negligence and that in any event appellant may not c~m­
plain because of his falure to request the Court to give 
a clarifying instruction. By his own neglect the appel-
lant may not lead the Court into an alleged prejudicial 
error concerning which he later complains. 
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III. 
THE COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GIVE DEFEN-
DANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 2. 
Defendant's Requested Instruction No.2 was as fol-
lows: 
"You are instructed that tbe fact that an 
automobile skids or slides while proceeding along 
a wet or slippery street is no evidence that the 
party is operating the same at an excessive rate 
of speed or in a careless or negligent manner." 
It is respectfully submitted that the. requested instruc-
tion was properly refused because it does not embody a 
correct statement of the law. While skidding in and of 
itself and in all circumstances does not necessarily con-
stitute evidence of negligence, it is a factor to be con-
sidered along with all the other factors in arriving 
at a determination as to whether or not the motorist 
was guilty of negligence. A correct statement of the 
doctrine generally accepted in cases of skidding is that 
set forth in 5 Am. Jur. at page 654, as follows: 
"Skidding, at least on a slippery pavement, 
is not necessarily due to negligence. The mere 
fact, therefore, that an automobile skids does 
not, of itself, constitute evidence of negligence 
upon the driver's part so as to render the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur applicable. Such skid-
ding is not an occurrence of such uncommon or 
unusual character that, unexplained, it furnishes 
evidence of the driver's negligence. 
The inquiry in cases of skldding is as to the 
driver's conduct previous to such skidding. The 
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speed of the autmnobile prior to the skidding and 
the care in handling the automobile, particular}~' 
in the application of brakes, are factors to be con-
sidered in detern1ining- whether or not tlwre was 
an exercise of due care. This is particularly true 
where statutory provisions are involved. Ex-
tremely slippery streets require correspondingly 
greater care in operation." 
In the case of Wallis v. NaJU/YYWJn, 61 Wyom. 231, 157 
P. (2d) 285, the Supren1e Court of Wyoming announced 
the following doctrine "'ith reference to skidding across 
the center line of the highway: 
'' ·It is likewise true that the skidding itself 
is not ordinarily evidence of negligence, where it 
skids across the center line of the road to the 
left side thereof and collides with another; but 
the burden ·is upon the driver on the wrong side 
of the road to excuse or justify the violation of the 
law of the road. Berry on Automobiles (4th Ed.); 
1 Blashfield, Encyl. of Automobiles, page 414; 
Chase v. Tingdale Bros., 127 Minn. 401, 149 N.W. 
654; Petersen v. Pallis, 103 Wash. 180, 173 P. 
1021; Thomas v. Adams, 17 4 Wash. 118, 24 P. 2d 
432; Wilson v. Congdon, 179 Wash. 400, 37 P. 
2d 892; Leonard v. Hey, 269 ~1ich. 491, 257 N.W. 
733; Johnson v. Freemont Canning Co., 270 ~iich. 
524, 259 N.W. 660.' 
Both 2 Blashfield, Cyc. of Automobile Law, 
Perm. Ed., Sec. 916, p. 58, and 3-4 Huddy, Cyc. 
of Automobile Law, Sec. 109, p. 176, announce the 
rule that skidding to the left side of . the road 
cannot be excused 'if the skidding is due to the 
negligent ac.ts or omissions of the motorist'." 
(Italics added.) 
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The attention of this Honorable Court is also in-
vited to the extensive annotations on this same subject 
in 58 A.L.R. 266 and 113 A.I.R. 1022. It is respectfully 
submitted that no prejudicial error was committed by 
the Court in refusing to instruct the jury in accordance 
with defendant's Requested Instruction No. 2 which 
was not a correct statement of the law. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully submits that a review of 
the entire record and the proceedings reveals that the 
defendant, Jack L. Clark, was afforded a fair trial, in 
accordance with established legal principles, which was 
free from prejudicial error. A careful reading of the 
transcript will reveal also that there is ample and suf-
ficient evidence contained therein upon which the verdict 
of the jury and the judgment of the court was based 
and that therefore his conviction for the crime of involun-
tary manslaughter should be affirmed by this Honorable 
Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLINTON D. VERNON 
Attorney Gener·al 
QUENTIN L. R. ALSTON 
Assista-nt Atto.rney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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